Pakistan’s national infrastructure projects are supposed to secure economic prosperity and energy independence for generations. Yet the 1,530 MW Tarbela 5th Extension Hydropower Project (T-5), instead of becoming another landmark of engineering excellence, has turned into a distressing story of escalating costs, repeated construction failures, delayed completion and questions about professional accountability. The August 2025 downstream cofferdam collapse and the November 9, 2026, flooding of Tunnel 5 and the powerhouse excavation area have exposed weaknesses that demand an independent investigation.
The most disturbing question is not simply why these incidents happened, but why a project employing highly paid professional engineering consultants experienced repeated failures despite the availability of established international engineering standards and modern construction technologies. At the centre of this investigation must be MM Pakistan (MMP), the consultancy organisation entrusted with professional supervision and engineering guidance.
The central issue is straightforward: why appoint an experienced consultant as the Engineer if it cannot guide the contractor, identify foreseeable geological risks, verify construction methods and protect a strategic national project?
An essential distinction in international engineering contracts is the difference between the employer, contractor and Engineer. Under FIDIC conditions of contract, the designated professional representative is commonly called the Engineer and is entrusted with specific contractual responsibilities. These include contract administration, examination of technical submissions, assessment of construction proposals, monitoring compliance, evaluating variations and exercising professional judgment within the authority granted by the contract.
WAPDA, as the employer, possesses administrative, financial and operational responsibilities. However, it is not necessarily equipped with the specialised knowledge required to independently evaluate every geological formation, structural calculation, hydraulic risk or underground construction methodology. Indeed, a client could theoretically be entirely unfamiliar with advanced engineering. That is precisely why it appoints a professional consultant.
A consultant cannot collect substantial professional fees for specialised expertise and subsequently transfer its technical responsibilities to the client. If a contractor proposes a construction method, the Engineer must independently examine its suitability. If a design deviation creates unacceptable risks, the Engineer must identify the deficiencies and exercise the contractual authority available to prevent non-compliant work. If geological conditions are dangerous, the consultant must ensure that appropriate investigations and protective measures are undertaken.
This means that FIDIC automatically makes the Engineer responsible for every failure or absolves the contractor and employer of their respective contractual obligations. Nevertheless, the consultant cannot escape its own professional duties by arguing that WAPDA approved a proposal or that the contractor carried out the construction. The real test is what independent engineering advice the consultant provided, what risks it identified, what objections it raised and what preventive measures it enforced.
A consultant cannot accept millions in professional fees for engineering expertise and then blame the client for lacking the very technical knowledge for which the consultant was appointed.
The first major warning came in August 2025, when the downstream cofferdam collapsed. A cofferdam is a critical protective structure designed to keep water away from construction areas. Its engineering requires detailed hydraulic calculations, geological assessment, structural stability analysis, proper filtration arrangements and continuous monitoring.
The three-member government inquiry reportedly established that the contractor proposed replacing the approved roller-compacted concrete (RCC) cofferdam design with a rock-filled structure, although the proposed change was not authorised under the existing contractual arrangements. The consultant accepted the deviation conditionally, while WAPDA subsequently approved the change without adequately examining its technical and contractual implications.
The inquiry also reportedly found that river discharge was within Tarbela’s historical range and below the stated design capacity, undermining the explanation that extraordinary flooding alone caused the disaster.
These findings raise serious questions about MMP’s professional performance. Why did the Engineer not insist on compliance with the approved design? Who independently examined the hydraulic and structural implications of the alternative arrangement? Who verified its filtration, erosion protection and stability?
Even more troubling is the reported handling of WAPDA’s request in July 2023 for a comprehensive cofferdam performance assessment. Rather than undertaking an independent technical review, the consultant reportedly passed the request to the contractor. The contractor’s report was not submitted until October 2024.
This raises a fundamental question: what is the purpose of appointing an independent Engineer if critical technical assessments are simply transferred to the contractor?
The contractor may propose designs and construction methods, but the Engineer must independently scrutinise them. If the consultant failed to provide timely technical guidance, failed to identify foreseeable risks or failed to enforce contractual requirements, its professional responsibility must be thoroughly investigated. WAPDA’s own approval decisions must also be examined. Accountability must be established through documentary evidence rather than predetermined conclusions.
Barely 15 months after the cofferdam collapse, water entered Tunnel 5 and the powerhouse excavation area during construction of the second-bench connecting tunnel. On November 9, 2026, WAPDA attributed the incident to the collapse of a weak rock mass, while the Haripur district administration referred to a breach in the protective bund. Workers were evacuated, and a worker reportedly swept away by the water was rescued.
The precise sequence of events requires independent forensic investigation. Did geological instability cause the water inflow? Did a protective bund fail? Were underground water pathways inadequately investigated? Were probe holes drilled ahead of excavation? Were groundwater pressures monitored? Were temporary barriers independently inspected?
These are not optional engineering questions. They are fundamental requirements of underground construction near major water bodies.
Most importantly, what additional safeguards did the consultant introduce after the August 2025 disaster? Did it conduct a fresh geological assessment? Did it revise the excavation methodology? Were the intake pit barriers, emergency gates, pumping arrangements and escape routes independently certified?
The consultant must produce its geological reports, excavation records, monitoring readings, inspection reports and professional instructions. The investigation must establish whether MMP guided the contractor appropriately at every critical stage.
A contractor must fulfil its independent obligations regarding construction methods, workmanship and site safety. However, the Engineer must also fulfil its contractual duty of professional supervision. Neither can use the other’s responsibilities as an excuse for its own failures.
Pakistan should examine India’s hydropower and tunnel-construction experience in the Himalayan region. This is not about political rivalry. It is about learning from a neighbouring country facing similar geological challenges.
The Himalayas contain fractured rock formations, active geological structures, fault zones, underground water pathways and areas of high rock stress. These conditions can produce sudden water inflows, tunnel collapses and severe construction difficulties.
India’s experience with the 520 MW Tapovan-Vishnugad Hydropower Project demonstrates the complexity of underground construction in Uttarakhand. The project encountered serious geological and construction challenges, while the 2021 Chamoli disaster caused substantial damage to its infrastructure. The Kishanganga hydropower project provides another important example of large-scale underground tunnelling in the Himalayan environment, including the use of tunnel-boring technology.
India’s Silkyara tunnel collapse in 2023 further demonstrated the dangers of inadequate understanding of ground conditions and the importance of emergency preparedness. Subsequent tunnel-safety discussions and construction guidance have reinforced the importance of geological investigations, excavation-support systems, instrumentation and documented safety procedures.
Pakistan must examine the application of these practices at Tarbela T-5. Detailed geological mapping must identify fault zones, fractured rock, water-bearing formations and potential instability before excavation. Probe-ahead drilling must identify weak formations and pressurised groundwater before the tunnel face advances. Ground-penetrating radar and seismic tomography can supplement drilling and geological investigations where appropriate, although neither replaces direct geological investigation.
Continuous monitoring must employ piezometers, extensometers, convergence measurements, load cells and, where appropriate, fibre-optic sensors to detect changes in groundwater pressure and rock movement. The New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) requires excavation and immediate support to respond to actual geological conditions. Depending on rock classification, this may involve systematic rock bolting, steel ribs, fibre-reinforced shotcrete, pipe umbrellas and pre-excavation grouting.
Underground construction near water bodies also requires independently verified protective barriers, automatic alarms, emergency pumping systems, rapid-isolation arrangements and alternative escape routes. The consultant must determine which technologies and construction methods are appropriate, ensure their implementation and verify their effectiveness.
The critical question is which of these measures were specified, installed, monitored and independently certified at Tarbela T-5. What was missing, and who was responsible? A national hydropower project should not become a testing ground for inadequate engineering supervision.
The engineering failures become even more painful when examined alongside the project’s financial performance. The original estimated cost of Tarbela T-5 was approximately Rs82.36 billion. Its revised cost has reportedly increased to Rs316.41 billion, representing an escalation of more than 284 per cent. Completion, originally scheduled for January 2021, has moved to a revised target of June 2028.
Consultancy expenditure reportedly increased from approximately Rs1.8 billion to more than Rs19 billion in the revised PC-I. Such an extraordinary increase demands a detailed examination of the professional services actually delivered.
The expected annual generation has also reportedly declined from approximately 1,810 GWh to 1,347 GWh, reducing the anticipated economic benefits. The World Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are financing this strategic national investment. The reported World Bank loan closure date of September 30, 2027, precedes the revised completion target of June 2028. This creates additional financing and implementation risks.
Pakistan cannot afford to lose billions through avoidable delays and inadequate supervision. The Auditor-General must investigate consultancy payments, contractual variations, design changes, temporary works, delayed milestones and financial losses arising from both incidents. If negligence or contractual violations are established, the government must pursue compensation through the applicable legal and contractual mechanisms.
The institutional dimension is equally disturbing. Engineer Waseem Nazir is identified as Chairman of the Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) and Managing Director of MM Pakistan. His reported ownership interests in MMP require verification through official company records.
PEC is Pakistan’s principal statutory engineering regulatory institution. Its responsibilities include professional registration, engineering standards, ethical conduct and regulation of engineering practice. If a company associated with the serving PEC Chairman is facing serious questions about its professional performance on a national mega-project, how can the public have complete confidence in the independence of regulatory scrutiny?
This is not a declaration of personal guilt. It is an unavoidable question of institutional credibility.
The government should immediately refer the matter to an independent conflict-of-interest investigation. Engineer Waseem Nazir should voluntarily step aside from the PEC Chairmanship while the matter is examined. Alternatively, the competent authority should consider temporary recusal or suspension through the applicable legal process. The investigation must verify ownership, management interests, contractual relationships and any potential overlap between private commercial interests and regulatory responsibilities.
No individual should participate in regulatory proceedings concerning an organisation in which that individual has a direct or indirect interest. PEC must remain an independent guardian of engineering ethics, not an institution vulnerable to questions about conflicts of interest.
The federal government must now take decisive action. An independent international forensic investigation into both the August 2025 cofferdam collapse and November 9, 2026, tunnel flooding must involve specialists in hydropower engineering, geology, tunnelling, hydraulics and FIDIC contracts. MMP’s professional performance as the designated Engineer must be examined, including its geological assessments, technical instructions, design reviews, supervision, staffing and response to construction risks.
The contractor’s conduct must also be investigated without prematurely absolving it or making it a convenient scapegoat. The investigation must determine whether it followed approved designs, specifications and instructions and fulfilled its independent construction and safety obligations. WAPDA’s approvals, contractual decisions, project management and response to professional warnings must also be examined.
The PEC Chairman’s potential conflict of interest must be investigated independently, with temporary recusal considered through the appropriate legal mechanism. The Auditor-General must undertake a comprehensive financial audit of cost escalation, consultancy expenditure, contractual variations, temporary works, payments and recoverable public losses.
Finally, no further dangerous underground excavation should resume until independent experts certify the geological conditions, probe-ahead investigations, rock-support arrangements, protective barriers, monitoring systems and emergency provisions. The complete inquiry findings must be published. Pakistan deserves to know what happened, who was responsible and how another disaster will be prevented.
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Tarbela T-5 is no longer simply a construction-management problem. It is a test of Pakistan’s engineering integrity, regulatory independence and institutional accountability. Our country is struggling with expensive electricity, imported fuel dependence and circular debt. Hydropower offers one of the most important opportunities to strengthen long-term energy security. Every avoidable delay at Tarbela therefore has consequences far beyond the construction site.
The most important lesson is that professional consultants cannot be allowed to escape scrutiny by transferring their responsibilities to the client or contractor. WAPDA must answer for its own decisions. Contractors must answer for their construction obligations. But the Engineer must also answer for the independent professional expertise and supervision for which public money was paid.
Imagine an ordinary Pakistani family struggling to pay its electricity bill while billions invested in additional hydropower capacity remain exposed to delays and repeated construction emergencies. Imagine workers entering underground tunnels, trusting that the engineers responsible for their safety have properly investigated the geology and groundwater conditions. Imagine the disappointment of Pakistan’s engineering community when a national project becomes associated with questions about the very institutions entrusted with protecting it.
This is why Tarbela deserves more than another departmental committee.
The Prime Minister, Ministry of Water Resources, WAPDA, Auditor-General and Pakistan Engineering Council must act without fear or favour. They must establish the truth, identify professional negligence, recover public losses wherever liability is proven and reform the institutions that allowed these weaknesses to develop.
No consultant should hide behind the client’s lack of technical expertise. No contractor should be blamed for failures that an independent investigation establishes were caused by inadequate professional supervision. No public authority should escape scrutiny for its own decisions. And no regulatory office should become protection against investigation.
Tarbela was built through the determination and engineering capabilities of an earlier generation. Its extension must not become a monument to professional negligence and institutional indifference.
The Indus belongs to the people of Pakistan. The money invested in its development belongs to taxpayers. The responsibility for protecting these national assets cannot be transferred from one institution to another.
Pakistan needs engineers who protect national assets, not merely consultants who administer contracts. It needs regulators who uphold professional ethics, not institutions vulnerable to conflicts of interest. Above all, it needs a government courageous enough to hold the powerful accountable.
The people of Pakistan have already paid an enormous price. They must not be asked to pay again for the same failures.
Tarbela T-5 must become the turning point for engineering accountability in Pakistan. The truth must be established, responsibility must be fixed, and justice must be delivered.
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